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Abstract 
Objective: Cognitive deficits following stroke are well documented, but less is known 
about problems with social skills such as understanding others' thoughts and feelings. 
This study investigated the effect of stroke on a visual-affective measure of social 
understanding: the Reading the Mind in the Eyes test (RMET).  The aims were to 
investigate whether right hemisphere stroke was particularly detrimental to this aspect of 
Theory of Mind (ToM), and investigate the relationship between ToM ability and 
executive function following stroke.  
Methods: Performance of stroke patients (right hemisphere stroke, n = 15; left hemisphere 
stroke, n = 15) was compared to that of controls (n = 40) matched for age, years of 
education and IQ on tasks measuring ToM and executive functioning.  
Results: Right hemisphere stroke was associated with impaired ToM ability, but left 
hemisphere stroke was not. There was no effect of stroke on a matched non-ToM control 
task. High correlations were found between performance on the RMET and some 
measures of executive functioning in participants with right hemisphere stroke only. 
Further analyses suggested that deficits in executive functioning could not statistically 
explain all of the difficulties shown by stroke participants on the RMET.  
Conclusions: A reduction in the ability to attribute mental states to others following right 
hemisphere stroke may adversely affect psychosocial functioning, disrupt interpersonal 
relationships, and lead to reduced quality of life. The clinical importance of these 
findings, implications for clinical practice and future research are discussed.  
 
Key words: stroke, theory of mind, executive functioning, social cognition. 
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Theory of mind and executive functioning following stroke. 
Stroke is an increasingly common neurovascular condition and the third largest 
cause of death in the UK (Wolfe, 1996), accounting for over 60,000 deaths each year 
(Allender, Peto, Scarborough, Boxer, & Rayner, 2006). Given that the population as a 
whole is aging, the number of new cases of stroke, recently estimated at 13,000 in 
Scotland each year (Scottish Stroke Care Audit, 2011), is likely to increase, putting more 
financial pressure on health services. Recovery from stroke often entails long-term and 
intense rehabilitation that focuses primarily on reducing physical limitations. However, 
even when physical recovery is achieved, enduring psychological and social difficulties 
can persist (Lai, Studenski, Duncan, & Perera, 2002), affecting social competence of 
stroke survivors. Physical and cognitive consequences of stroke are well recognised due 
to past research being mainly focused on these aspects of stroke recovery. However, since 
successful stroke recovery and rehabilitation is dependent on numerous factors, exploring 
the factors that affect psychological and social competence of stroke survivors is equally 
important in improving post-stroke outcomes. 
 
Theory of mind after stroke 
One such factor that may influence the psychological and social competence of 
stroke survivors is impairment in Theory of Mind (ToM). ToM is the ability necessary for 
comprehending mental states (such as thoughts, feelings, intentions etc.) of other people, 
and is viewed as essential for successful social communication (Baron-Cohen, 1995; 
Weed, McGregor, Nielson, Roepstorff, & Frith, 2010), as it forms the basis for predicting 
the actions of others. More specifically, ToM is regarded as having cognitive and 
affective components. Cognitive ToM is an ability to distinguish between the knowledge 
of self and other,  and to understand the thoughts, beliefs and intentions of another person, 
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whereas affective ToM is concerned with understanding anothers’ feelings (i.e. 
knowledge about emotions) (Shur, Shamay- Tsoory, & Levkovitz, 2008).  
Research on ToM in relation to stroke to date has concentrated mainly on focal 
unilateral brain lesion, investigating whether lateralisation of brain injury influences the 
magnitude of ToM impairments. Studies that have investigated both right hemisphere 
lesions (RHL) and left hemisphere lesions (LHL) in stroke participants have produced 
conflicting results about the lateralisation of ToM function (Griffin et al., 2006; Happé, 
Brownell, & Winner, 1999;  Siegal, Carrington, & Radel, 1996; Surian & Siegal, 2001; 
Tompkins, Scharp, Fassbinder, Meigh, & Armstrong, 2008; Winner, Brownell, Happé, 
Blum, & Pincus, 1998; Yeh & Tsai, 2014). Typical ToM tasks used in stroke research 
require participants to attribute and infer mental states of characters, who often hold false 
beliefs, from short stories and single-framed cartoons. As such, these tasks tend to 
measure mainly cognitive ToM. ToM stories, the most commonly used task to assess 
ToM ability in stroke, induce conflicting mental representations that need to be resolved 
to correctly interpret thoughts and behaviours of the story characters. Some previous 
studies have reported stroke participants with RHL to be more impaired than stroke 
participants with LHL and/or healthy controls on ToM stories (Happé et al., 1999; Siegal 
et al., 1996; Winner et al., 1998). Also, studies looking at second-order mental state 
attributions, in which participants need to infer what one character believes about the 
thoughts and intentions of another character, have suggested a presence of a deficit in 
stroke survivors with RHL (Griffin et al., 2006; Winner et al., 1998). 
These findings suggest that the right hemisphere is important in the cognitive 
processes that underlie ToM. However, considering the level of task complexity in ToM 
stories, it might be that a more general impairment in abstract-reasoning or pragmatic 
inference-making accounts for the ToM impairment (Weed, 2008). In fact, pragmatic 
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language difficulties after right hemisphere stroke have been widely recognised (see 
Martin & McDonald, 2003 for a review) and may influence performance on ToM stories 
that require deriving meaning from social context and discourse interpretation. According 
to Tompkins et al. (2008) the ToM stories used by Happé et al. included a larger number 
of perspective shifts, story characters, and times characters were mentioned, compared to 
supposedly matched control stimuli. After re-writing the control stimuli in order to 
balance out these potential confounds, Tompkins et al. found no differences in ToM 
abilities between stroke individuals with RHL and controls. Also, Tompkins et al.’s 
findings pinpoint a central theoretical issue in measuring ToM abilities, namely the 
employment of adequate control tasks. Such control tasks allow us to distinguish whether 
stroke effects reflect a specific deficit in ToM abilities or more general changes in 
understanding complex linguistic prose or perceiving visual information. 
 
Theory of mind and executive functioning after stroke 
Other cognitive processes that are likely to support ToM ability may include 
aspects of executive functioning (see Perner & Lang, 2000; Aboulafia-Brakha, Christe, 
Martory, & Annoni, 2011 for a review), such as attentional flexibility, inhibition of 
prepotent information, and the ability to update information in working memory. 
Functional interdependence of ToM and executive functioning has been reported 
(Aboulafia-Brakha et al., 2011; Bora et al., 2005; Channon & Crawford, 2002; Perner & 
Lang, 2000), and there may be overlap in the complex brain networks involved in both 
the social cognitive processes involved in ToM and the cognitive regulation processes key 
to executive function. Individual case studies indicate that a network of brain regions 
appears to be involved in ToM. In particular, damage to some specific regions of 
prefrontal cortex (Shamay-Tsoory, Tomer, Berger , & Aharon- Peretz,  2003; Stuss, 
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Gallup & Alexander, 2001), and regions of the temporal lobes such as the superior 
temporal sulcus  (Apperley, Samson, Chiavarino, & Humphreys, 2004) can disrupt ToM 
performance.  
Given the putative role of prefrontal-cortical-subcortical networks in both ToM 
and aspects of executive function, a number of studies have investigated the disruption to 
both processes in patients with lesions localized to prefrontal cortex. Results consistently 
indicate a dissociation between deficits in ToM and deficits in cognitive control functions 
which may be associated with  specific lesions localised within different areas of 
prefrontal cortex (Bird, Castelli, Malik, Frith, & Husain, 2004; Fine, Lumsden, & Blair 
2001; Rowe, Bullock, Polkey, & Morris, 2001; Bach, Happe, Fleminger ,& Powell, 2000; 
Happé, Malhi, & Checkley, 2001). However, in patients with more widespread aetiology 
of  brain damage likely to disrupt prefrontal connectivity more generally, ToM deficits 
correlate strongly with aspects of executive dysfunction (Henry, Phillips, Crawford, 
Ietswaart, & Summers, 2006; Aboulafia-Brakha et al., 2011). It remains unclear whether 
ToM ability after stroke is related to executive control functions, and no study to date that 
we are aware of has explored the association between these two constructs in a group 
study. Given the widespread network of brain connections that might be damaged by 
stroke, it is plausible that ToM and aspects of executive dysfunction might be related. 
 
The Reading the Mind in the Eyes test (RMET) 
Whether problems in interpreting others’ thoughts and feelings reflect a very 
specific and modular deficit, or instead are related to more widespread failures of 
cognitive function, including executive dysfunction, continues to be a topic of debate. In 
the context of post-stroke deficits, ToM tasks that are less dependent on language 
processes and complex cognition than the Stories tasks should be employed to tap ToM 
 
 
7 
 
impairments following stroke more directly. The Reading the Mind in the Eyes Test 
(RMET, Baron-Cohen, Wheelwright, Raste, & Plumb, 2001) has the benefit of relying 
less on complex language processing than the ToM Stories task, thus enabling the 
inclusion of individuals with expressive aphasia. The RMET requires participants to look 
at pictures of the eye region of the face and decide what thought or emotion is being 
shown. Because the trials in the task require understanding and making decisions about 
both thoughts (e.g. reflective) and emotions (e.g. worried), it likely taps into both 
cognitive and affective aspects of ToM (Shur et al., 2008).  Visual stimuli may also tap 
more naturalistic ToM used in everyday situations that often depend on accurate decoding 
of nonverbal behaviour. The RMET is shorter and less cognitively demanding than the 
Stories tasks (Bull, Phillips, & Conway, 2008), thus less susceptible to contamination 
from fatigue, memory impairment or executive dysfunction.  
The validity of the RMET as a measure of ToM is supported by evidence that it is 
sensitive to autism, and scores on the RMET task correlate with performance on classic 
verbal ToM tasks such as the Strange Stories (Baron-Cohen et al., 2001). Also, 
performance of the RMET activates similar brain networks to those seen in other ToM 
tasks, i.e. the superior temporal sulcus and inferior frontal gyrus (Adams et al., 2009).  
Factor analysis has confirmed that the items on the RMET all load on a single factor 
(Vellante et al., 2013). Although the RMET has been used in many previous studies (e.g. 
Vellante et al., 2013, in a selective review, cite over forty published studies using the 
task), the current study is the first study to use the task in a stroke sample. A matched 
control task containing no ToM component is also used in the current study to look at the 
specificity of ToM deficit after stroke. 
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Objectives 
In this study we aim to investigate: 
(1) The differential effects of right hemisphere versus left hemisphere stroke on a 
measure of visual ToM (RMET) and whether these effects are specific to ToM 
impairment. 
(2) Whether stroke participants’ performance on the measure of ToM (RMET) is related 
to their scores on measures of executive functioning, particularly cognitive flexibility 
and set shifting (verbal fluency) and response flexibility and inhibition (Brixton test).  
 
Methods 
Participants   
Thirty stroke participants and 40 demographically matched healthy controls took 
part in this study, after giving their informed consent. Ethical approval was given by the 
NHS Grampian Research Ethics Committee. Handedness was determined by self-report 
and all participants were right-handed with the exception of one male in the healthy 
control group. The National Adult Reading test (NART-R) (Nelson & Willison, 1991) 
was used in this study as a measure of pre-morbid intelligence (IQ) in the stroke 
participants, and to ensure that all stroke participants and control participants fell at least 
within the average range for IQ. 
For the stroke sample, participants were recruited from the post acute stroke 
rehabilitation ward at Woodend Hospital, Aberdeen. Seven males and eight females with 
LHL, as well as seven males and eight females with RHL were recruited.  Clinical 
features (e.g. type of stroke using the Oxford classification system, (Bamford and 
Sandercock, 1991), location of lesion and length of time since stroke) were obtained from 
the medical records. Lesion evidence was based on medical interpretation of clinical 
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radiological MRI or CT report. The stroke survivors were included if they had 
experienced a first ever ischaemic stroke (n = 28) or haemorrhagic infarct (n=2) localised 
in one hemisphere within the past six months. All stroke participants received speech and 
language intervention, occupational therapy and physiotherapy, as required as part of 
their ongoing rehabilitation. No participants received formal cognitive rehabilitation due 
to the limited clinical neuropsychology provision in this setting. A healthy control group; 
18 males and 22 females, were recruited via a local community group. Stroke and control 
participants were excluded from the study if they met any of the following criteria: 1) 
English was not their first language, 2) they were incapable of informed consent, 3) they 
had a previous or current medical history which is known to affect social processing or 
cognitive functioning (e.g. autism, dementia, significant brain/head injury, 
substance/alcohol abuse, anxiety disorder), 4) previous or current history of psychosis, 5) 
currently aphasic or suffering from moderate/ severe expressive or receptive aphasia, 6) 
they had uncorrected visual or hearing impairments.  
 
Procedure 
The measures were administered in accordance with the relevant manual 
instructions, although the RMET was modified slightly by asking the participant to read 
out loud or point to each of the four words before making their choice.  This was in order 
to compensate for the possible presence of visual neglect, which commonly occurs 
following stroke. Similarly, some individuals in the stroke group suffered from mild 
expressive aphasia (n = 7), and it was therefore not appropriate to administer some of the 
other tasks, such as the NART and Verbal Fluency task.  The task order was 
counterbalanced to minimise order effects, although the NART was always administered 
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after the Verbal Fluency task.  This was to prevent the possibility of participants using 
words from the NART to enhance verbal fluency performance.   
 
Measures 
The theory of mind (ToM) Reading the Mind in the Eyes test (RMET).  
The ‘Reading the Mind in the Eyes’ test (RMET) (Baron-Cohen, et al., 2001), 
consists of black and white photographs of the eye region of the face. Participants are 
asked to choose a word, from a possible four, which they believe best describes what the 
person in the picture is thinking or feeling (e.g. fantasising, worried, reflective, 
preoccupied etc.). Twenty-six pictures (1 practice, and 25 test items) from the test were 
used in this study, excluding ten items from the original test which were found during 
pilot work to have ceiling or floor effects (Bull et al., 2008, Slessor, Phillips, & Bull, 
2007). It is argued that successful completion of this task is dependent on an adequate 
conception of another’s mental states, and an ability to attribute mental states and 
emotions of others (Baron-Cohen, Jolliffe, Mortimore, & Robertson, 1997). This test was 
chosen because it has less cognitive load and a lower verbal component than other 
commonly used ToM tasks such as the ToM stories test (Happe et al., 1999) or the faux 
pas test (Stone, Baron-Cohen, & Knight, 1998). The dependent measure was the total 
number of correct responses. 
 
The Eyes control task 
The Eyes control task was designed to investigate the specificity of any group 
differences in ToM.  Using the same photographs used in the RMET, Baron-Cohen and 
colleagues (2001) developed a separate control task for the RMET in which subjects are 
asked to judge the sex of the person: however performance on this approached ceiling.  
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Developing this further,  Slessor et al. (2007) modified the Eyes control task, so that 
participants are required to make age and sex judgments about the person presented in the 
stimuli, from a choice of possible four sex/age range answers (e.g. Male 40-50, Female 
40-50, Female 50-60, Male 50-60). The four possible answers differed for each item, and 
were carefully piloted to establish that the control task was of roughly equivalent 
difficulty to the RMET task (Slessor et al., 2007).  The dependent measure was the total 
number of correct responses. 
 
Verbal fluency task: the Letter Fluency trials & Category Fluency trial. 
Reduced verbal fluency is considered to reflect poor cognitive control in terms of 
impaired mental flexibility and difficulty shifting cognitive set (Mitrushina, Boon, & 
D’Elia, 1999; Baldo & Shimamura, 1998). The most common Verbal Fluency task 
consists of four word-naming trials; three letters, and one category.  The Letter Fluency 
stimuli used in this study were the letters ‘F’, ‘A’, and ‘S’. For each letter, participants 
were required to say as many words as they could in one minute beginning with that 
letter, excluding proper nouns and the same word with a different suffix. The Category 
Fluency cue was ‘animals’: participants were asked to generate as many animal names as 
they could think of in one minute (Gladsjo, Miller, & Heaton, 1999). The dependent 
measure for each task was the total number of correct responses, minus repetitions and 
inappropriate responses. 
 
The Brixton test.  
The Brixton test (Burgess & Shallice, 1997) is a rule detection and rule following 
task designed to assess executive function.  In addition to assessing the ability to detect 
and follow a rule, the task also assesses response flexibility to the changing rules. Burgess 
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and Shallice (1996) found that people with frontal lobe lesions were generally poorer at 
the Brixton test than either controls or patients with posterior lesions, and tended to make 
more bizarre or guessing errors. Performance on the Brixton test predicts dysexecutive 
behaviour in everyday life (Odhuba, van de Broek, & Jones, 2005). In a 56 page stimulus 
book each page showed the same array of ten circles, with one of the circles being filled 
in. The position of this filled circle differed from page to page. The participant was shown 
one page at a time and was asked to guess where the next filled position would be, by 
trying to identify a ‘rule’, based on what they have seen on previous pages. The 
dependent measure was the total number of errors made.  
 
National Adult Reading test (NART). 
The National Adult Reading test (NART-2; Nelson & Willison, 1991) was 
specifically designed to provide a means of estimating the pre-morbid IQ of adult 
patients. The NART comprises a list of 50 words printed in order of increasing difficulty, 
and they are all ‘irregular’ or ‘atypical’ with respect to the common rules of 
pronunciation. Therefore, applying the common grapheme-phoneme and stress rules of 
the English language would result in incorrect pronunciation, and it has been argued the 
words can only be read and pronounced correctly if the participant is familiar with their 
written form (Nelson & Willison, 1991). Participants read the word list aloud, and the 
number of errors made was recorded. The dependent measure was predicted IQ. 
 
Beck Depression inventory (BDI-II). 
The revised Beck Depression inventory (BDI-II; Beck, Steer, & Brown, 1996) is a 
21-item self-report depression screening measure and has become one of the most widely 
accepted measures for assessing the severity of depression in diagnosed individuals, and 
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for detecting possible depression in normal populations (Beck et al., 1996).  Depression is 
known to be a common consequence of stroke, and can affect cognitive functioning.  
There is also evidence to suggest that individuals who are depressed are biased in their 
judgments of emotions in others (Leppanen, Milders, Bell, Terriere, & Hietanen, 2004).  
It was therefore used in this study as an attempt to control for the possibility of depression 
affecting performance on the RMET.  The score is the sum of all the selected statements 
with the maximum score being 63. The higher the overall score the more depressed the 
individual is likely to be. Three participants in the study met criteria for mild-moderate 
depression based on their BDI scores: one control, one person with left hemisphere stroke 
and one with right hemisphere stroke. All analyses were re-run excluding these 
participants and this did not alter the pattern of results reported below. Also note that BDI 
scores did not correlate with any of the measures in this study (RMET or the executive 
function measures).  
 
Results 
Demographic data 
Statistical analyses showed no significant differences between healthy controls 
and participants with RHL or LHL stroke in terms of male-female ratio,  χ2 (2) = .019,     
p = .99, age, F (2, 67) = 0.071, p = .93, years of education , F(2, 67) = 0.83, p = .44, 
NART predicted IQ, F (2, 67) = 2.06, p = .14, or depression scores as measured by the 
BDI, F(2, 67) =  0.22, p = .80. Means (M) and standard deviations (SD) for age, years of 
education, NART predicted IQ and the BDI are listed in Table 1. Note that seven out of 
15 left hemisphere stroke participants could not complete the NART due to mild 
expressive aphasia. 
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Time since stroke was computed by totalling the number of days that had passed 
between date of stroke and date of testing. The mean number of days post stroke for both 
the RHL and LHL groups is also included in Table 1. No statistically significant 
difference was found between the two stroke groups in terms of mean time post stroke, 
F(1, 28) = 0.30, p = .59, therefore, this variable was not included in further analyses.  
 
The RMET & the Eyes Control test   
Table 2 summarises performance of stroke and control groups on ToM and 
executive function measures. Raw scores for all tasks were used in the analyses.  A one-
way ANOVA comparing the three groups on the RMET revealed that the difference 
between groups was significant, F(2, 67) = 18.5, p < .001 ηp2 = .36. Further examination 
using Scheffe’s post-hoc analysis (p < .05) revealed that the stroke group with RHL had 
significantly fewer correct ToM judgments than either the stroke group with LHL or 
healthy controls. There was no difference between the LHL stroke group and healthy 
controls. No significant group effect was found on the Eyes Control test, F(2, 67) = 2.63, 
p = .079.  
 
Executive function measures: the Brixton test and the Verbal Fluency task 
There was a significant difference between groups on the Brixton test, F(2, 67) = 
12.4, p < .001, ηp2 = .27.  Scheffe’s post hoc comparisons showed that both stroke groups 
with RHL and LHL were significantly impaired on the Brixton test compared to the 
control group, but that the stroke groups did not differ from each other. With regards to 
the Verbal Fluency task, for the Category Fluency trial, there was a significant effect of 
group, F(2, 60) = 16.7, p < .001 ηp2 = .36. Again, both stroke groups’ scores were 
significantly lower than the controls, but did not differ from each other. For the Letter 
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Fluency trials, there was a significant effect of group, F(2, 60) = 8.21, p = .001 ηp2 = .22, 
with the stroke group with RHL performing significantly worse than the healthy control 
group. There was no significant difference in performance between the stroke group with 
LHL and either of the other groups, however this comparison lacks power because seven 
out of 15 participants with LHD could not complete the fluency tasks due to mild 
expressive aphasia.  
 
The relationship between performance on the RMET and scores on the executive 
function measures for the stroke groups and healthy controls 
Table 3 shows correlations between the RMET performance and scores on the 
three executive functioning tasks separately for each group. In the stroke group with 
RHL, the performance on the RMET was significantly correlated with the Brixton test 
performance, as well as the Category Fluency performance. Also, significant correlations 
were found between the two different types of fluency. In the stroke group with LHL 
none of the correlations were significant. In the healthy control group, the performance on 
the RMET was significantly correlated with Category Fluency.  Other significant 
correlations were found between some of the different executive function measures 
(Letter Fluency with both Brixton task performance and Category Fluency). 
  
Analysis of RMET using the executive functioning measures as covariates  
To investigate whether there were differences in stroke and control participants’ 
RMET performance after controlling for measures of executive functioning, ANCOVA 
was carried out.  In the analysis, the total number of correct responses on the RMET was 
entered as a dependent variable, whereas the total number of errors on the Brixton test, 
and total number of correct responses on the Category Fluency and Letter Fluency trials 
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were entered as covariates. Category Fluency score significantly predicted performance 
on the RMET, F(1, 57) = 5.37, p = .024, ηp2 = .086 but neither of the remaining covariates 
significantly predicted performance on the RMET, F(1, 57) = 2.37, p = .13 for the Brixton 
test, and F(1, 57) < 1, p = .92 for the Letter Fluency trials. Once the three executive 
function measures were co-varied, the group difference in performance on the RMET 
remained highly significant, F(2, 57) = 6.58, p = .003, ηp2 =.19. 
 
Discussion 
This study explored the effects of stroke on a measure of social understanding: the 
RMET. The aims were to differentiate the effects of right hemisphere versus left 
hemisphere stroke on this visual ToM task performance and to investigate whether ToM 
ability after stroke is related to aspects of executive dysfunction.    
 
Theory of Mind (ToM) impairments after stroke 
The results showed that stroke participants with RHL were significantly more 
impaired on the visual RMET than those with LHL, who performed similarly to healthy 
controls. This finding is in line with the previous literature investigating ToM 
impairments after stroke that used mainly linguistically complex ToM stories (Griffin et 
al., 2006; Happé et al., 1999, Siegal et al., 1996, & Winner et al.,1998). It has been 
questioned whether these impairments tap ToM directly (Weed, 2008). The RMET has 
the benefit of being less dependent on social language skills that are so frequently 
impaired after stroke. Current results suggest that the right hemisphere has a crucial role 
in supporting ToM ability. We tried to control for cognitive and perceptual factors 
involved in the RMET through our use of a matched control task which involved the 
same photographs and similarly difficult choices between four options. No significant 
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differences were found between the groups in performance on the Eyes Control test 
containing no ToM component, which makes it unlikely that the observed ToM deficit of 
stroke participants with RHL is simply an artefact of impairment in visuo-spatial abilities 
necessary for mental state attribution. It can therefore be concluded that the impaired 
performance on the RMET of the stroke participants with RHL in this study reflects a 
specific rather than more general cognitive or perceptual deficit. However, it must be 
noted that the level of semantic analysis involved in discriminating between mental state 
terms is greater than that involved in making age-gender judgments, and it would be 
useful in future research to develop a more linguistically complex non-ToM equivalent 
for future research.  
 
Executive function impairments after stroke 
Further analysis showed that stroke participants with both RHL and LHL 
performed significantly worse on the Brixton test of executive function, as compared to 
healthy controls.  However, the two stroke groups did not differ significantly from each 
other. This is consistent with previous findings showing executive dysfunction as a 
common problem following brain injury, irrespective of the side of lesion (Stuss & 
Levine, 2002). The finding that there were no significant differences between the stroke 
groups suggests the Brixton test and the RMET are measuring different constructs. A 
similar pattern was found on the Category Fluency task. However, for the Letter Fluency 
trials, only the stroke group with RHL performed significantly worse than healthy control 
group. This specific finding may be explained by the fact many individuals with language 
difficulties in the stroke group with LHL did not perform the letter fluency task. 
Therefore, this finding may not give an accurate reflection of the difficulties an individual 
with LHL may have with this aspect of executive functioning (i.e. mental flexibility).  
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Theory of mind and executive function after stroke 
This study also explored the relationship between ToM ability and executive 
functioning in the context of stroke. Current results indicated that performance on the 
RMET was strongly correlated with the performance on the Brixton test of executive 
function, although only in the stroke group with RHL. Furthermore, performance on the 
RMET was also strongly correlated with the performance on the Category Fluency trial in 
this stroke group, and only moderately correlated in the healthy control group. The 
correlation between the RMET and the Brixton test of executive function could be argued 
to reflect shared visual components, rather than necessarily indicating a link between 
executive dysfunction. However this would not be the case for the correlation with the 
Category Fluency trial which is dependent on verbal ability. Thus, these findings suggest 
that performance on the RMET is dependent, in part, on cognitive control processes such 
as ability to shift mental set. While Category Fluency is traditionally seen as a measure of 
semantic organisation sensitive to temporal lobe damage, it also involves control 
processes such as mental set-shifting to aid retrieval (as evidenced by dual task studies, 
e.g. Rende, Ramsberger & Miyake, 2002). Also meta-analytic evidence suggests that 
frontal lobe damage has similar effects on both letter and category fluency (Henry & 
Crawford, 2004), again supporting the involvement of cognitive control processes in the 
task.  
Some suggest (e.g. Hughes & Russell, 1993) that ToM measures tap such control 
processes as cognitive flexibility and response inhibition. There is evidence for a strong 
association between ToM and executive functioning (Aboulafia-Brakha et al., 2011; Bora 
et al., 2005; Channon & Crawford, 2000). However other studies present evidence for a 
dissociation between the two constructs (Bach et al., 2000; Lough & Hodges, 2002).  
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Significant correlations were not found between ToM and executive function 
measures for those with left hemisphere stroke lesions. For the verbal fluency tasks, this 
lack of correlations likely reflects the small numbers completing the measures, given that 
many of those with LHL also had expressive aphasia. It is of note that the effect size of 
the correlations between RMET and fluency is similar in all groups. More interesting is 
the finding that the LHL group showed no correlation between the RMET and the Brixton 
test of executive function, which was not dependent on spoken language. The correlation 
between Brixton performance and RMET scores in the RHL, but not the LHL groups, 
suggests that right hemisphere damage specifically leads to related problems with both 
executive control and theory of mind.  
When ANCOVA was carried out to further investigate the group effect on ToM 
while co-varying executive functioning performance, the results showed that the 
performance on the Category Fluency trial was the only covariate significantly associated 
with performance on the RMET. However, the group effect on ToM persisted after co-
varying for executive functioning.  This suggests that the difference in performance on 
the RMET was not driven by the deficit in executive functioning.  Hence, it is reasonable 
to assume that stroke had a primary impact on the RMET performance in this study.  An 
important limitation to note here is that we only carried out brief assessment of executive 
function, and it would be useful to carry out a broader battery of cognitive control tasks 
aimed at assessing updating, switching, and inhibition in future studies using the RMET. 
 
Limitations of the current study and suggestions for future research  
A strength of this study in understanding relationships between brain and 
behaviour is that all of the brain injury participants had the same aetiology, stroke. 
However, the initial presentation of haemorrhagic stroke is often qualitatively different 
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from ischaemic stroke. Only two of the participants in the current study had haemorrhagic 
stroke, and they were not outliers on any of the tasks. However, it would be useful in 
future research to explore the effects of different types of stroke on this area of 
functioning and its recovery over time. There are also issues concerning lesion specificity 
following stroke, which are common to most brain injured population studies. The very 
nature of stroke means that often individuals may have experienced asymptomatic strokes 
or prolonged transient ischaemic attacks in addition to the main stroke, which have been 
shown to result in infarction of brain tissue (Bogousslavsky, Hommel, & Basetti, 1998).  
It is therefore possible that some individuals in this study had further lesions to other 
areas of the brain which was not apparent on scans, similar to the findings following 
traumatic brain injury (TBI). Similarly, the brain imaging had in all cases been 
undertaken in the early stages following stroke to establish cause of symptomatology and 
guide clinical management.  As Happé et al. (1999) highlight, the final pattern of tissue 
damage may not be revealed by scans at this early stage owing to secondary physiological 
processes, which could result in either further damage or recovery of brain tissue being 
possible. Therefore, lesion information should be viewed with caution.  
A related issue concerns the length of time that had passed between the 
occurrence of stroke and date of testing.  It could be argued that the individuals in this 
study were still in the early stages of recovery (see Table 1).  It is well known focal 
neurological symptoms, as well as perceptual and attentional impairments have been 
found to recover markedly in the first 6 months post-stroke (Montagne, Nys, van 
Zandvoort, Kappelle, & de Haan, 2007).  However, the rationale for testing stroke 
participants in the post-acute stage of recovery was primarily because, in clinical 
rehabilitation settings, this is often the time when emotional or behavioural difficulties 
become apparent.  Whether the difficulties found in this study are longstanding or not 
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would require further research.  However, there is evidence to suggest that for some 
individuals, these difficulties will remain (Hochstenbach, den Otter, & Mulder, 2003; 
Rasquin et al., 2004; Happe et al., 1999).  
Also, since ToM abilities are generally regarded as essential for successful social 
functioning (Baron-Cohen, 1995; Weed, McGregor, Nielsen, Roepstorff, & Firth, 2010), 
it would be interesting to see whether impaired ability to attribute mental states to others 
affects psychosocial functioning, disrupts interpersonal relationships and leads to reduced 
quality of life. Yet, up till now, the emphasis of previous studies including this one, has 
been on focal unilateral brain damage, exploring the role of each hemisphere in ToM 
abilities. Future studies should explore how such impairments in ToM influence social 
functioning outcomes of stroke survivors and their quality of life. Another factor to 
consider is gender. There is evidence for a female advantage on ToM tasks such as the 
RMET (Vellante et al., 2013), and it would be useful in larger scale stroke studies in 
future to explore whether the pattern of deficits in ToM and social consequences differ in 
men and women.  
This study was motivated by an interest in improving clinical understanding and 
awareness of the social and emotional problems which can follow stroke. Like many 
clinically-based studies of ToM we used the very basic classification of left versus right 
hemisphere lesion to investigate deficits, and this has shown a clear association of right 
hemisphere damage with ToM impairment. Showing this association between side of 
lesion and ToM impairment may prove useful for daily clinical practice and assessment. 
However, to provide more detailed theoretical understanding of the brain-behaviour 
associations between site of lesion and ToM in future, it will be necessary to conduct 
studies which used more sophisticated structural imaging analysis to pinpoint more 
clearly the links between specific brain networks and ToM performance. This is 
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important to inform theoretical understanding of ToM. We did not have access to full 
structural scans for all stroke participants in the current study, but an important goal for 
future research would be to use composite imaging techniques to provide a clearer 
association between tasks such as the RMET and locations of brain damage.  
A limitation of this study is that it focused only on the RMET to assess ToM. The 
Eyes test involves a basic emotion recognition element (Baron-Cohen et al., 2001), and 
therefore it is possible that it does not measure the ToM construct directly, rather it taps 
emotion recognition ability. While some trials in the RMET ask about mental states that 
are not basic emotions (e.g. preoccupied, reflective) others have a stronger emotional 
component. It would be useful to more clearly separate out the role of emotion perception 
and understanding of non-affective mental states in those with right hemisphere strokes. 
There is evidence that right hemisphere brain damage impairs recognition of basic 
expressions of emotion more often than left hemisphere damage (e.g. Kucharska-Pietura 
et al., 2003).  Future studies should therefore use a basic emotion recognition measure as 
well, to control for this. Another issue is that the response options in the RMET may be 
biased, limiting the construct validity of the task as a measure of ToM (Johnson, Miles & 
McKinlay, 2008). A further limitation of the RMET is that it measures only a restricted 
range of different information conveyed through social interactions in real-life (e.g. 
gestures, verbal cues or context are not assessed by this task). Thus, it would be desirable 
to use it in conjunction with other ToM measures (e.g. video clips) that tap other socially 
relevant information. The long-term aim should be to validate in stroke samples measures 
that are more naturalistic than the RMET (e.g. the Awareness of Social Inference Test;  
McDonald, Flanagan & Rollins, 2002)  in order to delineate exactly which aspects of 
ToM are affected after stroke. This is important as increased understanding of the nature 
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of any impairment in social functioning is central to improved clinical management and 
rehabilitation. 
 
Clinical implications 
Recovery from stroke often entails long-term and intense rehabilitation that 
focuses primarily on reducing physical limitations. However, even when physical 
recovery is achieved, enduring psychological and social difficulties can persist (Lai, 
Studenski, Duncan, & Perera, 2002). At present, it is recommended that individuals who 
have been admitted to stroke rehabilitation wards are screened for mood disorders, which 
commonly occur following stroke (SIGN, 2010), and cognitive screening is increasingly 
becoming common practice. There appears to be less awareness however of the potential 
challenges individuals may have in dealing with social situations as a result of social 
cognition difficulties secondary to stroke.   
The results of this study suggest that individuals who have experienced right-
hemisphere stroke may be particularly susceptible to deficits in an aspect of social 
cognition commonly referred to as theory of mind (ToM). Showing this association 
between side of lesion and ToM impairment may prove useful for daily clinical practice 
and assessment by highlighting those individuals who may be most at risk of 
experiencing these types of social communication problems following stroke. Impaired 
ability to attribute mental states to others can interfere with how individuals use 
information conveyed through social interaction and can, in turn, impact on interpersonal 
relationships and social roles, potentially leading to reduced social participation and 
quality of life. Such difficulties are also known to affect rehabilitation progress (Hartman-
Maeir, Soroker, Ring, & Katz, 2002). As such, these results have important implications 
for the process of rehabilitation and relevance for relatives, carers and other professionals.  
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An initial step towards improving this aspect of social functioning would be to 
identify the nature and extent of difficulties presented. Consequently, there may be merit 
in screening for these types of social functioning deficits as part of routine assessment and 
when assessing rehabilitation progress and overall outcome following stroke (Carota, 
Staub, & Bogousslavsky, 2002). The RMET is a quick and simple measure to administer 
and score, and is relatively stress free for patients to complete.  Using the RMET, or 
similar, as a screening measure for these types of difficulties, may detect the often subtle 
deficits in the ability to attribute mental states. Information gained through the use of such 
measures could be used to identify patients who may benefit from compensatory 
strategies, such as encouraging significant others to convey emotions, meanings or 
intentions more explicitly or in written form.  
Clinical experience has shown that providing a cognitive or psychological 
explanation for observed behaviours can be extremely helpful for patients, families and 
other professionals, even if it only serves to increase understanding of the individual and 
their experience.  
 
Conclusions 
The study aimed to explore the differential effects of right hemisphere versus left 
hemisphere stroke on a measure of ToM (the RMET), and investigate the relationship 
between ToM ability and executive function following stroke. The results revealed that 
the stroke participants with RHL were significantly impaired on the RMET, as compared 
to healthy controls and the stroke participants with LHL. The fact that the stroke 
participants showed no impairments on a non-ToM control measure suggests that the 
right hemisphere stroke- related impairment on the ToM measure is specific to mental 
state reasoning per se.  
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The stroke participants with both RHL and LHL were impaired on most executive 
function measures. However, only the executive performance of stroke participants with 
RHL was highly correlated with their impaired performance on the ToM measure. The 
current findings extend our knowledge of the ToM impairments that can result from 
stroke by exploring more naturalistic visual ToM that depends on decoding nonverbal 
behaviour and by investigating the contributions of executive functioning in ToM 
judgements. An impaired ability to attribute mental states to others may interfere with 
how individuals use information conveyed through social interaction and can, in turn, be 
detrimental for psychological and social functioning. Consequently, screening for these 
types of ToM impairments as part of routine clinical assessment appears important. 
Increased identification of any impairment in social functioning would enable individuals 
to be more appropriately supported and is central to improved clinical management and 
rehabilitation. 
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Table 1 
 Descriptive statistics for participants with stroke and healthy controls 
 
 
RHL Group LHL Group HC Group 
N=15 N=15 N=40 
M SD M SD M SD 
 
Age (in years) 
   
  67.80 
  
 14.14 
   
  67.73 
    
   9.99 
   
  66.63 
 
12.74 
Education (in years)   11.73    3.08   10.87    2.26   12.13   3.55 
NART predicted IQ (score)* 105.40  11.22 101.38  12.08 108.88   9.47 
BDI-II score (0-63)     5.20    7.52     4.73    4.17     4.22   4.05 
Time post stroke (in days)   71.0  32.49   77.47  32.48 - - 
 
Note.* NART score for LHL group is based on the performance of 8 participants, as 7 were unable to complete it due to 
acquired aphasia.  RHL = right-hemisphere lesion, LHL = left-hemisphere lesion, HC = healthy control. NART = National 
Adult Reading test; BDI-II = the revised Beck Depression inventory 
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Table 2 
Descriptive statistics for Theory of Mind and executive function measures in participants with stroke and healthy controls 
 
 
 
RHL Group    LHL Group HC Group 
n = 15 n = 15 n = 40 
 
     M  SD         M  SD         M SD 
 
Total number of correct responses on 
      
    RMET    10.07   4.11       15.27   2.99        16.42    3.37 
    Eyes Control task    13.33   3.09       14.47   3.07        15.58    3.47 
   Category Fluency trial*   12.27    4.68       12.63   5.63        19.52    4.56 
   Letter Fluency trials (Combined)*   23.13  12.63       26.75 18.98        38.25  12.14 
Total number of errors made on       
   Brixton test   24.27    8.35       23.93   7.06        16.43    5.19 
Note. .* The Category Fluency trial and  Letter Fluency trials (Combined) scores for LHL group are based on the performance of 8 participants, as 7 were unable to complete them due to 
acquired aphasia. RHL = right-hemisphere lesion, LHL = left-hemisphere lesion, HC = healthy control. RMET = the Reading the Mind in the Eyes’ test. 
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Table 3 
Correlations between the Reading the Mind in the Eyes’ Test (RMET) and executive function measures in the three groups 
 
RMET Brixton test Category Fluency 
   RHL  LHL HC        RHL LHL HC RHL LHL HC 
          
Brixton test  - .57 *
 
n = 15 
 -.18 
n = 15 
- .15 
n = 40 
      
Category Fluency   .52 * 
n = 15 
  .42 
n = 8 
  .34 * 
n = 40 
  -.44 
   n = 15 
   -.41 
  n = 8 
-.21 
n = 40 
   
Letter Fluency .28 
n = 15 
  .22 
n = 8 
  .27 
n = 40 
  -.20 
   n = 15 
   -.63 
  n = 8 
-.37 * 
n = 40 
.73** 
n = 15 
.69 
n = 8 
.40 * 
n = 40 
          
Note. * p < .05, **. p < .01. RHL = right-hemisphere lesion, LHL = left-hemisphere lesion, HC = healthy control. RMET = the Reading the Mind in the Eyes’ test. 
 
